Procyclical absenteeism might be due to the higher sick rates of marginal workers, or be a consequence of procyclical incentives to report sick. These hypotheses predict opposite signs for the correlation between sick rates and shares of temporary contracts. Workers on temporary contracts are associated with lower job security in comparison with workers on time-unlimited contracts, implying that temporary employees run the highest risk of lay-off and are expected to have stronger incentives for job attendance. Using industry-region panel data, we find a stable negative correlation between sick rates and shares of temporary contracts implying that procyclical sick rates are compatible with the idea that incentives to report sick are also procyclical.
Introduction
There are two main hypotheses regarding the mechanisms behind a negative relationship between unemployment and sick rates. First, unemployment might affect the propensity to report sick. If an employee's higher sick rate increases the risk of job loss, a higher unemployment rate reduces the propensity to report sick. A second mechanism is related to the absence behavior of the marginal workers entering or leaving the working population in various states of the business cycle.
When employers can choose whom to lay-off, the most absence-prone workers are more likely to be laid off in an economic downturn (Leigh (1985) ). This implies that in downturns, the employees' absence rate falls. Analogously, the absence rate increases in times of falling unemployment when the marginal individual leaving unemployment to employment has an above average sick rate. Though several studies analyze the role of economic incentives for worker absenteeism we are not aware of any previous studies that deal with the over-time variation of sick rates and examine the mechanisms behind procyclical absenteeism.
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If the procyclical pattern of sick rates is a consequence of changes in employee composition, health insurance policies cannot do much about the over-time variation of sick rates. On the other hand, if this variation is due to changes in economic incentives, then there is scope for policy changes aimed at altering economic incentives. Understanding the mechanisms behind procyclical absenteeism is important for policy making with regards to health insurance and related labour market institutions.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the procyclical sick-rate pattern is due to changes in worker (sick-report) behavior or a result of higher sick rates among marginal workers and thus a workercomposition effect. Our empirical examination consists of investigating the relation between the share of temporary contracts and the sick rate.
The employment protection legislation in Sweden restricts the hiring and firing of workers. Time-limited contracts are allowed for (i) one trial period of six months, (ii) seasonal or temporarily excessive work loads, (iii) replacement of employees on leave, (iv) workers over 67 years and a few other cases. The Labor Protection Law (LAS) restricts the employers possibility of firing workers according to the last in first out rule. This rule must be followed within group of employees defined by negotiations between employers and unions. This implies that workers on temporary contracts who are characterized by lowest seniority are those who run the highest risk of lay-off. These restrictions on using temporary employment contracts and the seniority-based lay-off rule, imply that the share of temporary contracts is a good indicator of the share of marginal workers in Sweden. This is confirmed by our observation that the share of temporary contracts in expanding establishments is twice this share in contracting establishments. The selection effect (changes in worker-composition) hypothesis implies a positive correlation between sick rates and the share of temporary contracts. The worker-incentive effect hypothesis would, on the contrary, imply a negative correlation between these variables since workers on temporary contracts experience weaker job-security and therefore have an incentive to minimize sick-related absence. This is the case when a low sick rate improves the chances of a renewed contract. These two hypotheses predict opposite signs on the estimated coefficient for temporary contracts.
One possible strategy to examine the hypotheses outlined above is to rely on panel data over individual workers in order to obtain results concerning the relation between sick rates and contract types, controlling for individual heterogeneity. However, panel data with rich information on individuals, covering a substantial cyclical variation, is not easy to obtain. In addition, controlling for individual heterogeneity would imply fixed-effects estimation that relies on variations generated when individuals switch (often endogenous) contracts. Inference based on such variation is not likely to be valid for the labor market in general. Datasets with relevant information on individuals and suitable instruments for the contract type are difficult to obtain. Given these problems, we choose to rely on aggregated industry-region data while tackling the problem of heterogeneity, by controlling for industry-region differences as well as varying industry time trends.
It should be noted that with (non-experimental) individual microdata, it is difficult to deal with the potential endogeneity of the employeecontract type. In order to do so, it is necessary to find a variable, at the individual level, that is correlated to the type of contract an individual holds and not correlated to that individual's sick-reporting behavior.
The variation in the share of temporary contracts at the industryregion level is mainly generated by variation in quits and hires. The endogeneity problem is also present here when using industry-region data. We can, however, deal with this problem by using lagged values of the share of temporary contracts as instruments. In absence of experimental data, our strategy is a suitable way to examine the impact of temporary contracts on the sick-rate.
Our results imply that the sick rate and the share of temporary contracts are negatively and significantly correlated. This correlation is basically unchanged when we take into account the share of females, young workers, regional unemployment, industry-region effects, time effects as well as industry-specific time trends. Various time-specific effects capture all general business-cycle effects as well as changes in the social insurance system and permit that various industries and regions have different cyclical variation. Our results do not support the selection effect hypothesis but indicate that worker-behavior is influenced by the type of employment contract implying that less job-security is associated with lower sick rates. Finally, our sensitivity analysis regarding the endogeneity of temporary contracts as well as persistence in sick rates leaves our results basically unchanged.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 deals with data description and the the empirical model is laid out in section 3. Our results are reported in Section 4. The paper is concluded in Section 5.
Data
The data are from the Short Term Employment Statistics (Kortpe- This sampling strategy implies that the establishment level observations refer to different points in time for different establishments and are not perfectly comparable. On the aggregate-level, however, the information refers to the whole quarter since it is based on three measurements in every quarter. Moreover, the panel structure of the data on the establishment level is not satisfactory when considering longer periods. Small establishments enter and leave the data frequently while large establishments are present for most of the time.
To avoid measurement problems and obtain results referring to the total population we aggregated the establishment level data to a panel data set containing 56 industry-region cells (14 industries times 4 regions). An observation is thus an industry-region cell.
In order to avoid small industry-region cells represented by few firms, we aggregate the data for 4 regions including two big city regions (Stockholm and south-west Sweden), northern counties and all other counties. 
The Empirical Model
We estimate the following standard error-component model on our panel of industry-region cells:
where y it is the sick rate for industry-region cell i in the time t, x it is a vector of our basic explanatory variables: unemployment, share of female employees, share of temporary contracts and share of young workers aged 34 years or younger. The error term is decomposed into an industry-region effect, a time effect and a normally distributed error term with a zero mean.
A problem associated with estimating this model based on our data is that we must rely on data that is aggregated over temporary and permanent contracts. Let y it,κ denote the sick-rate for industry-region i in period t for workers on contract type κ, that is either temporary or permanent; κ ∈ {T, P }. Let us write the model for workers on contract type κ as follows:
By using aggregated data we only observe the aggregate variables y it and x it that are weighted averages of the corresponding variables for workers on permanent and temporary contracts; y it = (1 − q it,T )y it,P + q it,T y it,T and x it = (1 − q it,T )x it,P + q it,T x it,T , where q it,T is the fraction of workers on temporary contracts in period t. This imply the following statistical model:
where u it = (1 − q it,T ) it,P + q it,T it,T . This equation is of course not estimable because x it,T is not observed for the variables that are different between workers on temporary and permanent contracts. For these variables we must assume that β T = β P . This is the drawback of using aggregated data. For variables that are common between the two groups, such as unemployment and aggregated employment, we can interact these variables with the variable representing the share of workers on temporary contracts. By doing this we can check whether a change in the unemployment level has a differential effect on the sickrate depending on whether the share of temporary workers is high or low.
The claim here is that both workers on temporary contract and permanent contracts respond to changes in economic conditions but that the sick-report behavior of those who are on temporary contracts are less responsive to unemployment. Moreover, we have to allow for the possibility that the impact of temporary contracts on the sick rate might be due to the impact of unemployment working through the share of temporary contracts due to a procyclical pattern of temporary contracts. Introducing an interaction variable between the share of temporary contracts and the rate of unemployment accounts for these possibilities.
Measuring the number of individuals who reported sick on a certain day captures long term absenteeism with a higher probability compared to short term absenteeism. This should not be a major problem since absenteeism due to illness for employees with part or full-time temporary disability pensions are not included in our measure. However, given that employees on temporary contracts are less likely to be on long term absence, long term absenteeism is lower in industries with higher shares of temporary contracts. These types of systematic time-invariant industry-region differences are captured by our industryregion fixed effects. Notice that the standard variables determining individual absenteeism such as marital status as well as the number and age of children might differ across industries. This is captured by our fixed effects specification. Our objective is not to explain level differences in absenteeism across individuals or industries, but rather the pattern of changes over time. Moreover, we estimate a model including the number of permanent jobs as well as an interaction between the share of temporary contracts and the number of permanent jobs. This estimation allows us to control for differential variation over time in the share of temporary contracts that stems from variation in permanent jobs and its impacts on long term illness captured by our measure of the sick rate.
Finally, two problems might lead to inconsistent estimates. First, the share of temporary contracts might be endogenous. This is the case when increased sick rates lead to increased temporary employment in order to replace absent employees. 5 Such a positive correlation would make it difficult for us to observe a negative effect of temporary contracts on sick rates. Second, the dynamics of sick rates might be characterized by persistence over time. This is the case when workers' sick report behavior adjusts slowly to changes in incentives and/or changes in the share of marginal workers.
We deal with the endogeneity of the share of temporary contracts and the persistence of sick rate by applying the techniques suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) as well as Blundell et al. (1998) . This yields GMM-estimates where the share of temporary contracts is instrumented to account for endogeneity and the lagged sick rate is included as an explanatory variable in order to control for the possible persistence of sick rates.
Results
Results reported in Model 1, Table 2 indicate that sick rates are negatively correlated to unemployment, in line with previous studies. We consider time fixed effects by allowing year-specific intercepts. A possible time effect is the effect of changes in work pace-rates producing procyclical sick rates. Time fixed effects capture all global cyclical 5 If workers would be able to choose among contracts, the more sick prone workers would of course choose permanent contracts creating another source of endogeneity. This is, however, unlikely since these workers have to compete with other workers for attractive contracts and there is nothing to indicate that they have better chances of obtaining these jobs.
effects as well as all symmetric effects of changes in the social insurance system. The health insurance system in Sweden is guided by the principle of having general insurance with very little differentiation, a principle that also affects all changes in the system. In this way, the effects of institutional changes on sick rates are to a large extent symmetric for individuals in various industries.
Unemployment is closely tied to the general time pattern of sickrates, which explains why unemployment is insignificant in Model 2, Table 2 when year dummies are added to the model. We cannot separate the impact of unemployment from the general time effects in our data.
Our main concern here is the impact of temporary employment on sick rates which turns out to be negative and significant. These results seem to be robust controlling for a number of potential determinants of sick rate. The fixed effects results presented in Table 2 represent the impact of explanatory variables after controlling for industry-region fixed effects such as industry specific working conditions and the local labor market situation.
- Table 2 about hereAs discussed in Section 3, since we deal with aggregate data it is appropriate to check for interactions between the aggregate variables such as unemployment and the share of temporary contracts. The effect of unemployment on the sick-rate is less pronounced for temporary workers as these workers always run a considerable risk of lay-off compared to workers on permanent contracts that are seriously threatened only in times of high unemployment. This mechanism is reinforced by the seniority rule of layoffs imposed by The Labour Protection Law (LAS) as workers with permanent contracts has on average higher seniority and are more protected by this law compared to temporary workers. Moreover, we have to allow for the possibility that the impact of temporary contracts on the sick rate might be due to the impact of unemployment working through the share of temporary contracts due to procyclical patterns of temporary contracts. We estimated a model including an interaction variable between the share of temporary contracts and the rate of unemployment to control for these possibilities. Results reported in column 3, Table 2 , yields a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction term with the negative effect of temporary contracts on sick-rate intact. This result implies that the temporary contracts has a significant negative own effect and is not capturing an effect from unemployment on sick-rate. The positive effect of the interaction term implies that the sick-rate is less responsive to unemployment (share of temporary workers) as the rate of temporary workers (unemployment) gets higher. These results imply that the temporary workers are less responsive to unemployment than permanent workers supporting the incentive effect hypothesis.
Workers on temporary contracts have limitations on duration of the sick period due to the duration of their contract. Therefore we expect that the share of long-term absenteeism due to illness is negatively correlated to share of temporary contracts. As mentioned above, our measure of sick rate captures long-term sickness with a higher probability compared to short-term sick periods. To deal with this problem we controlled for the number of permanent contracts and the interaction between this variable and the share of temporary contracts. These two variables capture variations in sick rates that stem from variations in the number of permanent contracts as well as variations in the share of temporary contracts that is induced by variations in permanent con-tracts. Adding these controls leaves our estimate of the share of temporary contracts qualitatively unaffected indicating that the estimate for the share of temporary contracts represents own-effects (Model 4 in Table 2 ).
We also explicitly take into account the impact of the female rate of employment and the share of young workers. The coefficient for the share of female workers turns out to be positive and significant as expected. The coefficient for young workers is negative implying that younger workers are characterized by lower sick-rates. This coefficient is significant in Models 2-4 but turns insignificant when we control for industry-specific time effects in Model 5, reflecting the fact that within industry-region variation in the share of young workers over time is mainly industry-specific. The insignificant estimates for the age variable simply reflect the poor over-time variation in age variables other than those associated with the trend of an aging working population.
Controlling for industry specific time-effects does not leave much variation left to explain. This model returns insignificant effects for all basic control variables. The effect of temporary contracts is however intact. Our various controls do not alter the coefficient for temporary contracts in any substantial way. The estimated coefficient is negative and significant through all variations of our specification.
Dynamics of sick rate and endogeneity of temporary contracts
Let us turn to examining the robustness of results reported in the previous section. The workers' propensity of reporting sick might be persistent over time implying that we should include a lag dependent variable in our specification and estimate a dynamic model. We use a GMM estimator to estimate our dynamic model instrumenting the lagged dependent variable. Furthermore we account for endogeneity of the share of temporary contracts by instrumenting this variable with its lagged values. Instrumenting both the lagged dependent variable and the share of temporary contracts yields our GM M − IV y,x estimates.
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The estimated coefficient for the lagged dependent variable indicate persistence in the sick rate. Test statistics for AR(1) and AR(2) indicate that the residuals are not random walk and imply absence of serial correlation. Given this structure of errors, according to the Sargan test we can not reject that the instruments are uncorrelated with the errors implying validity of our instruments.
The various estimations presented in Table 3 always yield a negative and significant coefficient for the share of temporary contracts. The size of the coefficients range between -0.12 and -0.32. This is however a result of different estimators properties as well as the instrumenting procedure involved. Results basically confirm the results reported in Table 2 . The main difference is that the impact of temporary contracts is stronger which should be attributed to a positive bias due to the endogeneity of temporary contracts as a device to replace absent workers. Moreover, the effect of unemployment is even more unstable than what is observed in the fixed effects regressions. What is essential, for our purposes, is that the coefficient for share of temporary contracts is always negative and highly significant regardless of estimator used.
- Table 3 about hereResults reported in Table 2 and Table 3 unambiguously confirm the pattern that the share of temporary contracts and sick rates are negatively correlated. This result is not compatible with the idea that the positive correlation between employment and sick rates are due to a composition effect when the share of temporary contracts works as a proxy for marginal workers entering or leaving employment. Incidence of temporary contract is associated with a lower sick rate, implying that workers' absenteeism behavior might be influenced by whether they are on temporary or permanent contracts.
Final Remarks
We tested the hypothesis of whether the observed procyclical pattern of sick rates is due to changes in workers incentives to report sick as the conditions in the labor market change or if this pattern simply reflects changes in worker-composition when marginal workers with higher absenteeism enter or leave the working population.
The share of temporary contracts being a proxy of the share of marginal workers would be positively correlated to sick rates according to the latter hypothesis. On the other hand, employees on temporary contracts have stronger incentives for job presence when this affects future employment chances. The share of temporary workers should then be negatively correlated with the sick rate, when workers incentives to report sick affect the aggregate sick rate.
Our results indicate a negative relation between the share of temporary contracts and the sick rate in industry-region cells during the nineties in Sweden. Both the selection and incentive mechanism might be present behind the pattern of sick rates over time, but our results are in line with the idea that incentive-effects dominate. The evidence seems to support the explanation that procyclical sick rates are due to changes in worker incentives to report sick. The correlation between the share of temporary contracts and sick rates are robust to controls for industry-region effects, global time effects, share of females, age structure as well as variation in permanent jobs and changes in the share of temporary contracts resulting from variations in permanent jobs.
We also estimated a dynamic model taking into account the possible persistence in sick rates and instrumented the share of temporary contracts by its lagged values to account for the possibility of an endogeneity bias. All results confirm a negative correlation between sick rates and the share of temporary contracts, indicating that workers on temporary contracts have weaker incentives to report sick. Tables   Table 1 
Notes:
Number of industry-region cells is 616. Regions are Stockholm, Uppsala and Södermanland, Skåne and Västra Götaland, Norrland counties, Other counties. The 14 industry classification corresponds roughly to the two-digit system of industry classification. Aggregation of some industries was necessary to match the industry classification (SNI69) for observations from the period 1989-1994 and the new system (SNI92) for the period 1995-1998. Our 14 industries are: Banking and financial institutions, Construction, Real estate, Food and beverage, Electricity, gas and water, Hotel and restaurants, Chemical industry, Metal and machinery, Mining, Services, Textile, Detail and retail trade, Transport and, Wood and paper.
a The underlying data for these correlation coefficients are those used in Table 2 , i.e. deviations from industry-region means. 
i) Hausman tests indicate that for all model specifications, the individual effect is correlated with the regressors implying that the fixed-effects specification should be used.
ii) *, ** and *** indicate significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Notes:
a The number of observations used is 56*10 since both levels and differences are used in the estimation. i) The IV x estimator uses t − 2 to t − 11 lagged levels of the share temporary contracts as instruments. The IV y,x estimator uses instruments for the lagged dependent variable as well as instruments for the share of temporary contracts. DIF denotes the GMM-estimator using the Arellano & Bond (1991) procedure where first-differences are instrumented using levels. SYS refers to the GMM-estimator using the Blundell & Bond (1998 , 2000 procedure. GMM-estimates are obtained using DPD for Ox (see Doornik (1999) ).
ii) All models include yearly dummies.
iii) *, ** and *** indicate significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.
